Abstract Deforestation is a major source of CO 2 emissions, accounting for around 17 % of annual anthropogenic carbon release. While costs estimates of reducing deforestation vary depending on model assumptions, it is widely accepted that emissions reductions from avoided deforestation consist of a relatively low cost mitigation option. Halting deforestation is therefore not only a major ecological challenge, but a great opportunity to cost effectively reduce climate change impacts.
Introduction
Tropical deforestation is a major source of CO 2 emissions and the main cause of biodiversity loss. According to the 2007 Fourth IPPC report, deforestation accounts for around 17 % of total annual atmospheric carbon release [1] . Given the rising concern of potential dangerous risks accruing from high levels of atmospheric greenhouse gases (GHGs) concentrations, a large number of economic studies have already analyzed the potential for, and costs of, reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD). Estimates vary considerably depending on modeling and scenario assumptions; however, it is widely accepted that avoided deforestation can offer large mitigation opportunities at a relatively low cost. Thus, for instance, Kindermann et al [2] , comparing the results from three different global forestry and land use models, show that a carbon price of US$100 per ton of CO 2 could foster average global emission reductions of 3.1-4.7 Gt of CO 2 /year abatement from deforestation activities within the period . According to their analysis, the lowest-cost avoided deforestation opportunities are to be found in Africa, Central and South America, and Southeast Asia.
Similar findings come from a branch of literature which "couples" forestry models with economic-oriented integrated assessment models in the attempt to nest forestry dynamics into a more realistic representation of the economic system. In this vein, Sohngen and Mendelsohn [3] linked a global forestry model with the DICE model [4] and suggest that forestry could cost effectively account for 30 % of total carbon abatement across the century. Tavoni et al. [5] used the World Induced Technological Change Hybrid (WITCH) model to analyze the impacts of introducing forestry mitigation opportunities on the costs of meeting a 550 ppmv CO 2 concentration target. According to this last study, forest activities generate policy cost savings of around 40 % that could be used to finance an additional 0.25°C temperature reduction by the end of the century. Both studies considered the opportunities jointly offered by avoided deforestation, afforestation, reforestation, and forest management. More recently, Bosetti et al. [6] isolated the role of avoided deforestation under the more stringent stabilization target at 450 ppmv CO 2 . This study explicitly models an emission trading market based on national emissions reduction commitments with the possibility to "bank" emissions allowances. When REDD-generated credits can be sold, forest emissions considerably decrease and total costs of the stabilization policy are lowered in a range of 10-23 %. Or, alternatively, REDD could enable an additional reduction of 20 ppmv of CO 2 equivalent concentration without policy costs increase.
The comprehensive Eliasch Review [7] has investigated the impact of introducing credits from forestry activities and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) into the European Union emissions trading scheme (EU ETS). The role of forest credits is substantial: it could lower the costs of halving global carbon emissions from 1990 levels up to 50 % in 2030 and to 40 % in 2050.
Anger and Sathaye 2008 [8] linked a global carbon market numerical equilibrium model with a dynamic partial equilibrium forest model to analyze the role of CDM projects and avoided deforestation credits under different climate policy scenarios. When the EU unilaterally commits to a 20 % emissions reduction, with respect to 1990 levels, avoided deforestation and CDM reduce carbon market prices from 55€ and 248€ per ton of CO 2 in energy and non-energy intensive sectors, respectively, to a common carbon price of 5€ per ton of CO 2 .
Finally, Anger et al. [9] , using a numerical multi-country, two-sector partial equilibrium model of the global carbon market, concluded that the international permit price would decrease by 45 % when, in addition to CDM, unlimited carbon credits from avoided deforestation are available. Moreover, policy compliance costs decrease by more than one third. Their analysis assessed the impacts of climate policies in a single period market ending in 2020 considering a post-Kyoto 2012-2020 scenario where emission reduction targets were based on public announcements.
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) literature also contributed to this debate, even though the number of studies is limited. A summary of the research undertaken to bring together CGE literature with land use and forestry is provided by Hertel et al. [10] . Combining agriculture and forestry, Hertel et al. [11] analyses the mitigation potential of land use related emissions [12] . The authors calibrate a CGE model to replicate the mitigation potential for each sector using information from USEPA (2006) [13] for agriculture; and from a partial equilibrium global timber market model described in Sohngen and Mendelsohn [14] for forestry.
Gurgel et al. [15] is, to the best of our knowledge, the only study to investigate the role of REDD in global climate policy using a CGE framework. 1 The authors disaggregate the original agricultural sector in the Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model in three different sub-sectors: crops, livestock, and forestry. The modified model is then applied to analyze the economic consequences of biofuels potential production.
Our contribution to the literature is thus two-fold.
(a) We offer probably the first study analyzing the impact of REDD and REDD credits in the carbon market with a CGE framework aiming to capture indirect effects on domestic/international land and timber markets. (b) Our methodology could also help to enhance land use/ forestry description in global CGE models overcoming one of their major limitation [10] . Specifically, we explicitly consider the possibility that total forest land can endogenously expand (or decrease less) responding to carbon prices, crowding out agricultural land. In that, we follow a methodology with some similarities to Hertel et al. [11] , but of simpler application. As in Hertel et al. [11] , the supply of REDD credits and thus of carbon sequestered per region in the CGE model are calibrated on the data provided by a partial equilibrium land use/forestry model, in our case the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) model cluster [18] . Differently from Hertel et al. [11] , we do not use the Agro Ecological Zone (AEZ) approach [19] . 2 Accordingly, we do not have direct land competition between agriculture and forest industry.
We rather assume that effects of reduced deforestation translate both in less land available to agricultural activities, and to a lower natural resource input to the timber industry.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents data and modeling framework. Section 3 discusses results and section 4 concludes.
The Modeling Framework
The modeling tool used for the analysis is the recursivedynamic Intertemporal Computable Equilibrium System (ICES) CGE model. It is based on the core structure of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model [20] and database version 6 [21] . Its production side is, however, that of the GTAP-E model [22] . This is in order to account for a more satisfactory representation of the energy and emission sides of economic systems. GTAP-E also includes carbon taxes and an Emission Trade (ET) module to simulate an international carbon market which is key to our investigation. We updated that, originally restricted to emission reduction from fossil fuel use, to account for emission reductions from avoided deforestation and the trading of originated carbon credits. As said, the model is a dynamic recursive one. However, in the present study, we use it in a simplified version basically projecting in just one time step all the system from 2001 (the calibration year) to 2020. The regional and sectoral detail of the model, its production tree, and baseline assumptions are reported in Appendix I.
The role of avoided deforestation has then been introduced through three different channels.
Firstly, following [6] , we introduce avoided deforestation marginal abatement cost curves estimated by simulations of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) model cluster [18] , prepared for the Eliasch report [7] . These data have been obtained combining a global partial equilibrium model integrating agriculture, bioenergy, and forestry (Global Biomass Optimization Model-GLOBIOM [23] ), with G4M, a spatially explicit global forestry model [24] . Following Kindermann et al. [2] , we assume that avoided deforestation and the associated credits come only from the lowest-cost avoided deforestation opportunities areas: Africa, Central and South America, and Southeast Asia. This would, however, cover more than the 94 % of total world deforestation activity (2000 data) according to the deforestation rates reported by the model cluster [18] . Therefore, the emission reductions from REDD (REDD_CO 2 ) are a function of the abatement cost in terms of price per ton of CO 2 (pco 2 ) as in Eq. (1).
These reductions are then subtracted from the total emissions (TCO 2 ) originated by the ICES model in each region to get the net emissions (NETCO 2 ) following Eq. (2):
In addition, we allow for each region providing emission reductions from REDD to sell REDD_CO 2 credits in exchange of the abatement effort. The generated credits can be sold in the international carbon market and accrue national income of the sellers and decrease that of the buyers. This implies that the quota set for each region participating in a carbon market (QCO 2 ) is also corrected by the emissions reduction accomplished thanks to REDD efforts, and therefore in the REDD carbon market we use a net quota (NETQCO 2 ).
Secondly, changes in deforestation patterns fostered by the possibility to sell REDD credits into the carbon market affect agricultural, forestry, and pastureland use, i.e., the regional land stocks. Indeed, more forest remaining unharvested implies a lower amount of land available to agricultural and pasture activities. This lower availability is defined with respect to a baseline land availability under "business as usual deforestation rates". Both baseline regional land availability and its mitigation policy-driven change have been estimated starting from the IIASA model cluster. This provides baseline emissions from deforestation that we converted to (lost) forest hectares using Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) data [25] . 4 To simplify, we assumed that each hectare lost to forest is gained to agriculture/pasture (and vice versa). 
. Thirdly, reduced deforestation resulting from different carbon prices also decreases the total amount of wood entering timber markets. To account for this fact, we follow a similar approach to the one described above. ) induced by lower deforestation rates. The relation between non-harvested hectares and timber production from primary forest (cubic meters) has been estimated coupling data from FAO [25] with Brown [26] 5 reporting information on timber extraction from primary and forest plantations.
Three different scenarios are compared:
(i) No policy business as usual: This is a 2020 benchmark obtained perturbing the calibration year equilibrium (2001) in order to replicate regional population and GDP growth consistent with the IPCC A2 scenarios.
(ii) European emission reduction policy without REDD: This assumes that Europe implements unilaterally a 20 % emission reduction compared to 1990 (low end of the "Copenhagen Pledges" for the EU). At this stage, we consider only one regional aggregate for Europe, thus this exercise is equivalent to one in which, within this region the burden of abatement can be allocated efficiently across sectors and countries through a carbon market. This policy scenario is extremely simplified and partly unrealistic in its assumption of a fully integrated European carbon market without separation between ET and Non-ET sectors. These features, however, allow us to better focus on the performance of our methodology. Other studies followed a similar approach; see for example Böhringer et al. [27] , Lutz and Meyer [28] and Baker et al. [29] . Moreover, our set up can anyway provide useful information on the lowest possible (maximum efficiency) costs of a European unilateral action, which, given the current development of international negotiations on climate after Doha is not that unrealistic indeed. (iii) European emission reduction with REDD: Same as above, but with the additional possibility for Sub Saharan Africa (SSA thereafter), Central and South America (LACA thereafter), and Southeast Asia (EASIA thereafter) to enter the European carbon market selling REDD credits. Note that it is assumed that these regions can participate in the carbon market even without accepting binding reduction quotas, but only on the basis of proven reductions in "business as usual" deforestation activities. This option has been chosen as it should provide the highest incentive to REDD countries to engage in deforestation actions and allows us to isolate its role in the policy context. 5 See page 41 of Brown (2000) [26] . 
REDD and Overall Policy Implication
The unilateral mitigation policy imposes on the region a reduction of 866 million tons of CO 2 originating a price on the carbon market of US$46/t CO 2 (Table 1) at a cost for Europe as a whole of roughly 0.95 % of its GDP compared to the baseline 6 ( Table 2 ). The unilateral European effort originates the well known leakage effect. Commodities produced in countries with a less stringent climate policy (in our case without a climate policy indeed) become more competitive as they are not charged with environmental taxes. They are thus increasingly demanded, and increasingly produced. Consequently, emissions outside Europe also increase. The study highlights a quite strong leakage (+1.2 % of emissions in nonEuropean countries) offsetting roughly 45 % of European reductions (see Fig. 1 ). 7 This, however, should be interpreted as the most pessimistic possible outcome as it is assumed that no country outside Europe will put in place any emission reduction policy. Interestingly, in this context, it is the USA that contributes more to the world increased emissions; however, emerging economies (LACA, Former Soviet Union (FSU), Middle East (MDE), and China) also represent a significant share.
By opening the European carbon market to REDD credits, the price of carbon is expected to drop to US$8/t CO 2 (a reduction of 83 %). Basically, the supply of REDD credits, without restriction, could alone meet almost the totality of the required policy emission reduction. Accordingly, the concern that an unrestricted use of REDD credits could flood the carbon market appears justified in this specific context. Europe would buy US$6,710 million of imported pollution rights (see Table 3 ), but "gaining" a drop of GDP costs from the original 0.95 % to 0.16 % compared to the baseline.
The most interesting effect is probably that on leakage: the possibility for Europe to buy emission reductions from REDD countries is much less penalizing in terms of competitiveness than a unilateral reduction. European commodities "suffer" less in international markets and symmetrically the competitive advantage for non-European countries is reduced. The increase in non-European emissions now offsets just 12 % of Europe's reduction (see Fig. 1 ) and GDP gains in the rest of the world are lower (see Table 2 ).
This trend applies to REDD countries as well. On the one hand, SSA, EASIA, and LACA increase their GDP in the REDD scenario compared to the no policy baseline scenario. Thus, benefits from selling REDD credits to Europe are larger than the costs of deforestation. We recall that in our exercise, they are triggered by lower land available to agriculture/ pasture and lower raw wood supply to the timber sector (see below). On the other hand, all these regions are unambiguously better off if a carbon market is introduced in Europe without the possibility to use REDD credits (see 8th and 2nd columns in Table 2 ). While this may seem counter-intuitive, the explanation behind this result is actually straightforward since it is directly related with carbon leakage. For REDD countries, the European loss of competitiveness in a unilateral mitigation action outweighs gains from selling REDD, but to a more competitive Europe. This is a typical example of indirect Fig. 1 Carbon leakage (in % of European emission reductions) 7 High estimates for the leakage rate are not uncommon. For example, in a similar 20 % carbon dioxide emission reduction policy for EU, BednarFriedl et al. [32] estimate a leakage rate of 38 % when industrial processes emissions are also accounted for in the final estimation, and a rate of 29 % when considering combustion emissions only. In addition, the fact that only the European region implements the policy is an important element for a high leakage rate. effects-on GDP through competitiveness-being larger than direct effects-on GDP through revenues from sold credits. This is not uncommon especially when the latter, as in our case, are small. They indeed amount just to 0.08, 0.21, and 0.09 % of GDP for EASIA, SSA, and LACA, respectively. 8 Thus, summarizing: a full opening of the carbon market to REDD credits would be in Europe's interest, but not in that of REDD regions. Rephrasing this using the coalition theory jargon: the participation by REDD regions is profitable, but not internally stable. For them, it would be better to free ride on the European agreement. Note also that, in our context, gains from free riding arise only because of higher competitiveness and not because of an improved environmental quality brought about by European emission reductions.
This result should be interpreted with care: indeed it is driven by the economic leakage which is difficult to measure per se and can vary because of many factors. Firstly, it is determined by the size of the agreement. Larger participation and the possibility to sell REDD together with other emission reduction credits may lower its size. Secondly, it depends on the evolution of the import/export composition in the world market on its turn influenced by technological factors which are very difficult to capture. Thirdly, it depends on the substitution possibility between imported and domestic goods, i.e., Armington elasticities, which can change over time.
Effects on Agriculture and Timber Sectors
A critical aspect regarding the use of REDD credits in an international carbon market concerns its eventual impact on land and agricultural prices on regions selling avoided deforestation credits. To show the relevance of this effect, Figs. 2, 3, 4 and 5 contrast the change in land, agricultural production, and prices, as well as timber prices estimated by our exercise, i.e., considering effects on land and timber supply ("modified model" in figures), with those originated by an exercise in which these are not included ("unmodified model" in figures).
When direct land use effects resulting from reduced deforestation are not modeled, we observe that land prices are marginally affected when the European carbon market is opened to this type of credit. In contrast, when these are taken into account and no restrictions are imposed to the used of REDD credits, land prices increase by 1.1 % for SSA, 2 % for EASIA, and 1.4 % for LACA with respect to business as usual levels (see Fig. 2 ). One could expect to observe a higher increase in land prices especially considering that the current policy would reduce deforestation rates in the year 2020 by 22 % compared to business as usual. However, in terms of agricultural/ pastureland, this means a lower availability of just 0.5 % compared to business as usual (BAU). Figures 3 and 4 show the change in agricultural production and prices for the three REDD regions and the world aggregate. While for the latter these remain practically unchanged, changes occurring in EASIA, LACA, and SSA reveal an interesting effect. When direct land impacts of avoided deforestation are not explicitly modeled, the European unilateral policy actually tends to increase agricultural production (especially for cereal crops and in EASIA), consequently the overall positive effect on and recomposition of regional GDP. This higher supply of agricultural products leads, in its turn, to a reduction in prices. In contrast, when direct land impacts of avoided deforestation are modeled, this effect virtually disappears as lower land available to agriculture counter balances the effect. This eventually leaves agricultural production virtually unchanged.
We observe similar results regarding changes in timber prices. When timber flows are not directly modeled to take into account land use change impacts, prices remain almost 8 Note, however, that in our analysis, we are not considering any targeted use of the revenues from REDD credits that could entail higher progrowth potential. unaffected. However, when these are explicitly modeled, timber prices increase by 2.6 % in LACA, 3.4 % in EASIA, and 4.7 % in SSA (see Fig. 5 ). An interesting case is that of the LACA region: indeed the climate policy (with and without REDD) would decrease land and timber prices below business as usual levels also when direct effects on land and timber are not considered. This is a typical sectoral recomposition effect: although LACA economies are more competitive when Europe implements its mitigation policy, indeed LACA GDP increases and their terms of trade improve, these gains are concentrated in the raw material and heavy industry sectors and not in agriculture and forestry whose changes in production are minor. When the policy-induced land and timber scarcity are correctly modeled, however, their prices increase. In this section, we analyze the consequences of introducing limits to the use of REDD credits into the European carbon market. Restriction levels are defined as the maximum amount of total reduction efforts that can be met by Europe using REDD credits. Restrictions can be justified to control the carbon price decrease and maintain a sufficient dynamic stimulus to the development of environmentally friendly and energy saving technologies, but also, in the light of what was said before, as an incentive to REDD countries to sell credits and not free ride on the unilateral mitigation policy. Tables 1 and 2 present, respectively, the different levels of CO 2 prices and policy costs under various restriction levels. As can be expected, under the European perspective, both carbon prices and policy costs increase with restrictions. Limiting the use of REDD credits therefore consists of an effective option to preventing an eventual flooding of "cheap" credits into the European carbon market and to keeping carbon prices high enough to stimulate investments in greener technologies, however, at the expense of higher policy costs.
A good compromise between these two conflicting instances could be represented by a 30 % restriction to REDD credits: the carbon price would be reduced by approximately 32 %, against the 83 % reduction when no limits to these type of credits are imposed; at the same time the policy cost measured in terms of European GDP loss compared to the baseline equals 0.63 %, against 0.95 % in the case where no REDD credits are allowed to enter the carbon market. The carbon leakage would remain quite high though, still offsetting 35 % of European reductions (see Fig. 1 ).
Under the point of view of the REDD regions, first of all it can be noticed that revenues from selling credits are not linear with restrictions (Fig. 6 ). They are determined by the elasticity along the supply curves of REDD credits. Thus, they typically follow a bell-shaped trend. The largest revenues for SSA and LACA are experienced when restrictions approximately reach 50 %, whereas for EASIA when they are no larger than 90 %.
However, it is also clear that, except from the case of SSA, when the use of REDD credits is limited to 5-10 %, no restriction is able to make REDD regions better off participating Note: 100% means no restriction to REDD credits use, 0% means no possibility to use REDD credits in the market, than not participating and having Europe mitigating with unilateral action (see Table 2 ). It is thus confirmed that in our specific exercise, indirect effects on competitiveness overcompensate direct REDD revenues from selling credits.
Conclusions
In this paper, we developed a methodology to address the role of REDD in climate policy within a computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework. A multiregional, multisector CGE model was modified to account for both direct and indirect effects occurring on land and timber markets resulting from lower deforestation rates. These, endogenously driven by carbon price signals, then trigger changes in land available to agricultural/pasture activities and in raw timber supply to the wood industry according to estimated functions which are implemented into the model.
In the policy scenario considered, Europe reduces its CO 2 emissions by 20 % with respect to 1990 levels in the year 2020 through the implementation of a carbon market. Consistently with previous works, we observed that including emissions reductions from avoided deforestation generates considerable policy cost savings peaking up to 80 % when no restriction to REDD credits use is imposed. We also confirmed that an unlimited availability of REDD credits could "flood" the market, drastically reduce carbon prices (by 83 %), and therefore possibly lower the incentive to develop energy and carbon saving technologies. However, this can be effectively controlled, limiting the access to avoided deforestation permits. For instance, a 30 % restriction to REDD credits use would anyway reduce the policy cost by 34 %, but keeping the carbon price at the acceptably high level of US$31/t CO 2 .
REDD has the additional benefit of reducing carbon leakage effects resulting from the introduction of the European climate change policy. While leakage amounts for almost 45 % of European reductions under a European carbon market excluding REDD, this number decreases to 12 % when unlimited access to REDD credit is allowed. The trend in carbon leakage is "mirrored" by that of the economic leakage. Each reduction in the first is coupled with a lower decrease in European commodities' competitiveness in international markets. This has important policy implications. Allowing REDD entails gains for Europe. This is not necessarily so for REDD regions though. They benefit from the inflow of REDD revenues, but they also face a more competitive Europe in the trade arena. Indeed, we showed that the second effect prevails over the first. More specifically, GDP in REDD regions is higher when they sell avoided deforestation credits to Europe compared with a no European policy scenario. Thus, benefits from avoided deforestation are higher than the opportunity costs represented by a lower land available to agriculture and pasture activities and by a lower timber supply to the wood industry. Nonetheless, when EASIA, SSA, and LACA sell credits to Europe, their GDP is lower compared to the case in which there is no REDD credits exchange. In other words, REDD regions would find it preferable to free ride on the European mitigation policy. Note that in this analysis, we are not taking into account the environmental benefits triggered by European emission reductions, but just those arising from international trade effects. If those were included, the free riding incentive would be even stronger. We also showed that, by and large, no restriction to REDD credits use can revert this outcome.
Finally, the use of REDD credits can effectively reduce deforestation activities (by 22 % in 2020 without restriction) and induce only moderate increases on land and timber prices in REDD regions (in a range of 1-2 % the first and of 2.6-4.7 % the second).
Having developed and tested this methodology, our future research agenda includes improving the dynamic nature of the whole exercise, and analysis of further policy scenarios. At present, we are using a recursive-dynamic model just projecting the whole system in one jump to 2020. In a next work, we would use 1 year time-steps to implement more detailed time specific curves for deforestation activities.
Annex I: ICES Technical Appendix
ICES is a recursive-dynamic CGE model for the world economy that builds upon the original GTAP model structure, for which a detailed description is available at [20] . 9 ICES solves recursively a sequence of static equilibria linked by endogenous investment determining the growth of capital stock from 2001 to 2050. For a more detailed description of the model, the reader can refer to [33] and [34] .
Industries are modeled through a representative firm, minimizing costs while taking prices as given. In turn, output prices are given by average production costs. The production functions are specified via a series of nested CES functions. Domestic and foreign inputs are not perfect substitutes, according to the so-called "Armington" assumption. The production tree is reported in Fig. 7 . 9 The ICES model was developed at the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), more information is available at the following website:
http://www.feem.it/getpage.aspx?id=138&sez=Research&padre= 18&sub=75&idsub=102.
Additional technical documentation on the GTAP model and GTAP database are available at https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/ A representative consumer in each region receives income, defined as the service value of national primary factors (natural resources, land, labor, capital, see Fig. 8 ). Capital and labor are perfectly mobile domestically but immobile internationally. Land and natural resources, on the other hand, are industry-specific.
This income is used to finance three classes of expenditure: aggregate household consumption, public consumption, and savings. The expenditure shares are generally fixed, which amounts to saying that the top-level utility function has a Cobb-Douglas specification. Public consumption is split in a series of alternative consumption items, again according to a Cobb-Douglas specification. However, almost all expenditure is actually concentrated in one specific industry: non-market services.
Output
Private consumption is analogously split in a series of alternative composite Armington aggregates. However, the functional specification used at this level is the Constant Difference in Elasticities form: a non-homothetic function, which is used to account for possible differences in income elasticities for the various consumption goods.
Investment is internationally mobile: savings from all regions are pooled and then investment is allocated so as to achieve equality of expected rates of return to capital.
In this way, savings and investments are equalized at the world, but not at the regional level. Because of accounting identities, any financial imbalance mirrors a trade deficit or surplus in each region.
The regional and sectoral detail of the model used for this study are represented in Tables 4 and 5 . The use of land is only required by the agricultural sectors. Natural resources are divided into forestry, fishing, and fossil fuels, and are employed respectively by the forestry, fishing, and fossil energy industries (see Table 5 ).
The business as usual scenario was calibrated to reproduce the GDP growth rates according to the IPCC A2 scenario and is reported in Table 6 . Assumptions on the evolution of population (taken from UNPD [35] ), energy efficiency (taken from Bosetti et. al. [36] ), CO 2 emissions and major fossil fuel prices (based on EIA [37] and EIA [38] ) are also incorporated and reported in Table 7 .
